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IV. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following questions are presented to the Supreme 
Court for review: 
1. Should certiorari be granted where the decision of 
the Utah Court of Appeals (for the first time in Anglo-Saxon legal 
history) condones private parties entering a private home through 
trickery? 
2. Is certiorari proper where the Court of Appeals has 
decided an important issue of state law which has not been settled 
by the Supreme Court? This question is whether emotional distress 
damages are recoverable in a fraud case. As the Court of Appeals 
stated in its opinion: "Whether emotional distress damages are 
recoverable for fraud is a question of first impression under Utah 
law." (185 Utah Adv. Rptr. at p. 18.) That important question 
should be decided by the Supreme Court. 
3. Is certiorari proper where the Court of Appeals has 
decided a question of state law in a way that is in conflict with 
a decision of the Supreme Court? Jackie Turner asserts that the 
standard of review espoused by the Court of Appeals conflicts with 
the Supreme Court's opinions in Koer v. Mayfair Markets, 19 Utah 2d 
339, 431 P.2d 566 (1967); Management Committee v. Graystone Pines. 
Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982); and Rovlance v. Davies. 18 Utah 2d 
1 
295, 424 P.2d 142 (1967). The confusion should be resolved by the 
Supreme Court. 
V. 
OFFICIAL REPORTS 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at Turner 
v. General Adjustment Bureau. Inc. et al., 185 Utah Adv. Rptr. 16 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992), as Exhibit A. 
VI. 
GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals opinion was filed on April 22, 1992. 
By stipulation of all parties to this appeal, the time within which 
to file a Petition for Writ of Certiorari was extended to June 19, 
1992. 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the decision 
of the Court of Appeals by writ of certiorari under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2 and Rules 45-51 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
VII. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF LAW 
The controlling provisions of law in this case are case 
law citations designated in the Argument section of this Petition. 
Constitutions, statutes, ordinances, and regulations do not govern 
this appeal. 
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VIII. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
This action arises from a "pretext" surveillance investi-
gation performed by a private detective firm ("Inteldex") through 
its employees Dennis Dye and Ronnie Hyer. The subject of the 
investigation was James Turner, Jackie Turner's husband2. 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals summarizes the facts 
as follows: 
On November 30, 1984, Turner's husband filed a 
workers' compensation claim asserting that he 
was injured in a work related accident. His 
employer's workers' compensation insurance 
carrier, Occidental Fire and Casualty Insur-
ance Company, retained GAB to adjust the 
claim. GAB, in turn, hired Inteltech to 
investigate the claim. 
Inteltech employees, masquerading as repre-
sentatives of a product marketing research 
company, conducted an undercover investigation 
of the claim over a period of approximately 
three months. Utilizing the marketing company 
facade, they gained access to the Turner home 
to gather information about the activities of 
Turner's husband3. Inteltech employees 
visited the Turners at their home and asked 
them to test various consumer products on a 
*In this petition, "R." refers to the record; "T." refers to 
the trial transcript, found at R. 953-955; "T. of H." refers to the 
transcript of the May 4, 1990 hearing on Turner's motions for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial, found at 
R. 952. 
2James and Jackie Turner were subsequently divorced. 
3The private detectives entered the home at least five times 
under this same pretext. (T. 261-263.) 
3 
continuing basis. In addition to testing 
products, an Inteltech employee invited Turner 
to participate in a shopping spree. However, 
on the day the shopping spree was scheduled to 
occur, Inteltech canceled it. Turner claims 
that as a result of the invitation, she lost 
approximately twenty dollars because she had 
hired and paid a babysitter4. 
185 Utah Adv. Rptr. at p. 17. 
Jackie Turner then brought this action against the 
defendants claiming fraud, invasion of privacy, and conspiracy. (R. 
2-12.) The jury rendered a verdict against Turner on the fraud and 
invasion of privacy claims; and therefore, did not reach the 
conspiracy claim of damages. (R. 721-723; 894-897.) 
After trial, Turner moved for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict or for a new trial on all issues submitted to the jury. 
(R. 725-726; 818-819.) The trial court granted judgment notwith-
standing the verdict and denied the motion for a new trial. (T. of 
H. 19-29; R. 813, 890-893.) The trial court entered judgment, 
jointly and severally, against the defendants on the fraud, 
invasion of privacy, and conspiracy claims for $20 in out-of-pocket 
expenses; $5,000 for general damages; and $3,000 for punitive 
damages. Turner moved to amend that judgment to allow the damage 
issue to go to the jury. (R. 930-931.) The trial court denied that 
motion to amend. (R. 935-937.) 
4The depth and sophistication of the ruse is shown by 
plaintiff's trial exhibit 1 (Ex. B, hereto). Note that American 
Marketing Research & Development is a wholly fictitious company. 
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The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court1s grant 
of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, concluding that (1) the 
trial court erred in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict; 
(2) the trial court correctly refused to instruct the jury that 
emotional distress damages are recoverable in a cause of action for 
fraud; and (3) the trial court correctly admitted evidence of 
Turner's psychiatric history and past drug use. (See, Ex. A.) 
IX. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS THE 
FIRST TIME IN HISTORY THAT ANY ANGLO-SAXON 
COURT HAS CONDONED ENTERING A PRIVATE HOME BY 
TRICKERY 
Certiorari may be granted where a decision of the Court 
of Appeals " . . . has so far departed from the accepted and usual 
course of judicial proceedings. . . as to call for the exercise of 
the Supreme Court's power of supervision.11 Rule 46(c) Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. This is such a case. 
In Semayne's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 
1603) the court stated: 
. . . that the house of every one is to him as 
his castle and fortress, as well for his 
defense against injury and violence, as for 
his repose. . • • 
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed 
the importance of the axiom that, Ma manfs house is his castle." 
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Pavton v. New York. 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed.2d 1371 
(1980) (". . . unequivocal endorsement of the tenet that fa manfs 
house is his castle1."); Weeks v. United States. 232 U.S. 383, 390, 
34 S.Ct. 341, 343, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1913) ("The maxim that 'every 
man's house is his castle,1. . . has always been looked upon as of 
high value to the citizen.") 
It has been 389 years since Semayne's case, supra. In 
that time, no Anglo-Saxon Court has ever approved or condoned the 
entry of a private home by private citizens through trickery. 
Indeed every case been to the contrary. 
One of the leading cases on invasion of privacy is De May 
v. Roberts. 9 N.W. 145 (Mich. 1881) . De May is important here 
because of its factual similarity to this case. In that case, De 
May, a doctor, brought a person named Scattergood with him to 
assist in the delivery of the plaintiff's baby. Upon arriving at 
the plaintiffs home, De May did not properly identify Scattergood. 
The plaintiff assumed Scattergood was also a doctor. As the court 
outlined, De May and Scattergood were "bid to enter, treated kindly 
and no objection whatever made to the presence of defendant 
Scattergood. . . . [B]oth of the defendants in all respects 
throughout acted in a proper and becoming manner actuated by a 
sense of duty and kindness." Id. at 147. Affirming judgment for 
the plaintiff based on Scattergood having witnessed the delivery, 
the court explained: 
6 
It would be shocking to our sense of right, 
justice and propriety to doubt even but that 
for such an act the law would afford an ample 
remedy . . . the plaintiff had a legal right 
to the privacy of her apartment at such a time 
and the law secures to her this right by 
requiring others to observe it, and to abstain 
from its violation. The fact that at the 
time, she consented to the presence of 
Scattergood, supposing his to be a physician, 
does not preclude her from maintaining an 
action and recovering substantial damages upon 
afterwards ascertaining his true character. 
In obtaining admission at such a time and 
under such circumstances without duly 
disclosing his true character, both parties 
were guilty of deceit, and the wrong thus done 
entitles the injured party to recover damages 
afterward sustained from shame and mortifi-
cation upon discovering the true character of 
the defendants. 
Id. at 148-49; See also. Dietemann v. Time. Inc.. 284 F.Supp. 925 
(D.C. Cal. 1968); Young v. Western & A.R. Co. . 39 Ga. App. 761, 148 
S.E. 414 (1929) (search without warrant); Thompson v. City of 
Jacksonville 130 So.2d 105 (Fla. 1961) (same); Walker v. Whittle. 
83 Ga. App. 445, 64 S.E.2d 87 (1951) (entry without legal authority 
to arrest husband); Welsh v. Pr it chard. 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 
(1952) (landlord moving in on tenant); Ford Motor Co. v. Williams. 
108 Ga. App. 21, 132 S.E.2d 206 (1963) reversed 219 Ga. 505, 134 
S.E.2d 32, conformed to 108 Ga. App. 723, 134 S.E.2d 483 (entry 
into plaintifffs home was held to be an invasion of her privacy, 
even though he was not there at the time) ; Miller v. National 
Broadcasting Co. 187 Cal. App.3d 1463, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1987) 
(Most individuals understand it is a crime or a tort or both to go 
7 
into a private home without consent.); State v. Hyem. 630 P.2d 202 
(Mont 1981); Hester v. Barnett. 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. App. 1987), 
c.f., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B Illustration 4: 
A is seeking evidence for use in a civil 
action he is bringing against B. He goes to 
the bank in which B has his personal account, 
exhibits a forged court order, and demands to 
be allowed to examine the bank's records of 
the account. The bank submits to the order 
and permits him to do so. A has invaded Bfs 
privacy. 
If this decision stands, it will be the first time in the 
history of Anglo-Saxon law that any court anywhere has condoned 
entry into a private home by private parties through trickery. 
Likely, private detectives all over the U.S. will cite this case to 
justify similar schemes of trickery5. 
POINT II 
CERTIORARI IS PROPER BECAUSE THE COURT OF 
APPEALS DECIDED AN IMPORTANT ISSUE OF STATE 
LAW, WHICH HAS NOT BEEN, BUT SHOULD BE, 
DECIDED BY THE SUPREME COURT 
In this case, the Court of Appeals addressed an issue of 
first impression in Utah: whether emotional distress damages are 
recoverable in an action for fraud. The Court of Appeals ruled in 
the negative; however, there is a split of authority on the issue. 
5The private detective firm (Inteltech) has prepared a packet 
which justifies the legality of this type of pretext surveillance 
for potential customers. (T. 103.) The opinion of the Utah Court 
of Appeals will surely go into that packet for all future customers 
across the U.S. to see. At the time of trial, Inteltech had fifty 
to one hundred such pretext investigations in process. (T. 100.) 
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A thorough analysis of this issue was undertaken by 
Professor Andrew L. Merritt of the University of Illinois College 
of Law in his well-reasoned law review article, Damages for 
Emotional Distress in Fraud Litigation; Dignitary Torts in a 
Commercial Society, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (1989). 
In that article, Professor Merritt discusses the existing 
case law on this issue: 
The proper measure of fraud damages always has 
been a matter of controversy. . . . Relatively 
few cases have considered the propriety of 
awarding damages for non-pecuniary loss. . . . 
Though a substantial body of precedent now 
addresses this issue, no judicial consensus 
has emerged.] 
Id. at 3. Based on a detailed analysis of policy issues, Professor 
Merritt concludes: 
Balancing these interests suggests that, as a 
general rule, emotional distress damages 
should be awarded in fraud actions. 
This issue of first impression should be addressed by the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
POINT III 
CERTIORARI IS PROPER BECAUSE THE COURT OF 
APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF STATE LAW IN A 
WAY THAT IS IN CONFLICT WITH DECISIONS OF THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
When a court grants a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict, the standard of appellate review is the same standard 
which applies when passing upon a motion for directed verdict. Koer 
9 
v, Mavfair Markets. 19 Utah 2d 338, 342, 431 P.2d 566 (1967). A 
directed verdict is appropriate when "reasonable minds would not 
differ on the facts to be determined, from the evidence 
presented6." See. Management Committee v. Graystone Pines. Inc.. 
652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982). 
This was the standard applied by the trial court. In 
granting the judgment notwithstanding the verdict, Judge Wilkinson 
stated "no reasonable minds could have differed on the evidence 
which was presented to [the jury]." (185 Utah Adv. Rptr. at p. 17.) 
The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict is only justified if, "after looking at 
the evidence and all of its reasonable inferences in a light most 
favorable to the party moved against, the trial court concludes 
that there is no competent evidence which would support a verdict 
in his favor." (185 Utah Adv. Rptr. at p. 17.) The Court of 
Appeals cites Gustaveson v. Gregg. 655 P.2d 693 (Utah 1982) and 
King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah 1987) to support its 
conclusion. 
The difference between those two standards is signifi-
cant. There are many cases where there may be some evidence to 
support the verdict, but the overwhelming weight of the evidence is 
6Koer states the test slightly differently: " . . . the absence 
of any substantial evidence to support the verdict." 19 Utah 2d at 
342. 
10 
such that reasonable minds really could not differ on the evidence 
presented• 
This confusion and inconsistency in the standard of 
review should be resolved by the Supreme Court. 
X. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in Points I, II, and III, the 
Supreme Court should grant certiorari in this case to review the 
opinion of the Court of Appeals. 
DATED this a day of June, 1992. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Appellee/Cross-
Appellant 
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EXHIBIT A 
police, compare nazzoia, *V*L r.za ai ^oo; 
Moore, 284 F. Supp. at 727-28; People v. 
Kelly, 195 Cal.App.2d 669, 16 Cal. Rptr. 177 
(1961); People v. Cohen, 57 Misc. 2d 366, 292 
N.Y.S.2d 706 (1968); Commonwealth v. 
McCloskey, 217 Pa.Super. 432, 272 A.2d 271 
(1970). Nor did university officials attempt to 
delegate their right to inspect rooms to the 
police, which would result in the circumven-
tion of traditional restrictions on police acti-
vity. Compare Piazzola, 442 F.2d at 286; 
Moore, 284 F. Supp. at 728; Kelly, 16 Cal. 
Rptr. at 179; McCloskey, 272 A.2d at 272. In 
light of the recurring troubles with vandalism 
and other damage that had occurred on 
Hunter's floor, Smith alone made the decision 
to conduct a room-to-room search for 
university purposes, without any input from 
the university police. .The sole purpose of 
Officer Milne's presence was to provide assi-
stance in the event that Smith confronted 
problems he was not able to handle on his 
own. Thus, no action was taken which would 
promote circumvention of constitutional rest-
rictions placed on police action. 
CONCLUSION 
The search undertaken to protect the univ-
ersity's interest in maintaining a safe and 
proper educational environment, as well to 
fulfill the requirements of the housing cont-
ract, was reasonable. Accordingly, we reverse 
the trial court's determination that evidence of 
the stolen property found in Hunter's room 
should be suppressed. Additionally, since the 
trial court's sole ground in suppressing 
Hunter's confession is based on its erroneous 
determination that the stolen property should 
be suppressed, that determination is also rev-
ersed. This matter is remanded to the trial 
court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. > V-
Leonard H. Russon, Judge ! ' 7 
WE CONCUR: ,'^-'" '". ' 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
1. Utah Xode Ann. §76-6-404 (1990) enumerates 
the elements of theft; Utah Code Ann. §76-6-
412(l)(d) (1990) provides that if the value of the 
property stolen is $100 or less, then theft of such 
constitutes a class B misdemeanor. , 
2. The State further argues that even if the warran-
tless search did violate Hunter's constitutional 
rights, the trial court nonetheless erred in suppres-
sing Hunter's confession on the basis that, but for 
the entry and seizure of the property, Hunter would 
not have confessed to the theft. Because of our 
resolution of the search issue, we need not address 
the State's argument on this second issue. 
3. Compare, e.g., Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. 
of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725, 729 (M.D. 
Ala. 1968); State v. Kappes, 26 Ariz. App. 567, 550 
P.2d 121, 124 (1976); People v. Kelly, 195 
Cal.App.2d 669, 16 CaJ. Rptr. 177 (1961); People v. 
1971); Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777 (W.D. 
Mich. 1975); Morale v. GrigcU 422 F. Supp. 988, 
(D. N.H. 1976); People v. Cohen, 57 Misc. 2d 366, 
292 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1968). 
Cite as 
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Before Judges Garff, Greenwood, and 
Russon.1 \ "/' ';' y 
This opinion is subject to revision before . 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
GARFF, Judge: 
Defendants, General Adjustment. Bureau 
(GAB), Inteldex Corporation, d/b/a Intel-
tech (Inteltech), and Oak Norton (Norton) 
appeal the trial court's judgment notwithsta-
nding the verdict (j-n.o.v.) in favor of plain-
tiff, Jackie Turner (Turner), and the punitive 
damages award. Turner cross appeals, asser-
ting that the trial court erred (1) by refusing to 
instruct the jury that emotional distress 
damages are recoverable in a cause of action 
for fraud, (2) by admitting evidence concer-
ning Turner's past drug use and psychological 
history, and (3) by refusing, after granting 
j.n.o.v., to submit the issue of damages to the 
jury. We reverse., 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
FACTS 
On November 30, 1984, Turner's husband 
lied a workers' compensation claim asserting 
hat he was injured in a workrelated accident, 
iis employer's workers' compensation insu-
ance carrier, Occidental Fire and Casualty 
nsurance Company, retained GAB to adjust 
he claim. GAB, in turn, hired Inteltech to 
nvestigate the claim. 
Inteltech employees, masquerading as repr-
esentatives of a product marketing research 
:ompany, conducted an undercover investig-
ition of the claim over a period of approxi-
nately three months. Utilizing the marketing 
:ompany facade, they gained access to the 
Turner home to gather information about the 
ictivities of Turner's husband. Inteltech 
tmployees visited the Turners at their home 
ind asked them to test "various consumer 
)roducts on a continuing basis. In addition to 
esting products, an Inteltech employee invited 
Turner to participate in a shopping spree, 
iowever, on the day the shopping spree was 
cheduled to occur, Inteltech cancelled it. 
Turner claims that as a result of the invitation, 
he lost approximately twenty dollars because 
he had hired and paid a babysitter. 
Turner further claims that as a result of her 
inwitting participation in the undercover 
nvestigation, she lost time she could have 
pent working. Turner's work consisted of 
asks performed for her landlord on a by-the-
ob basis, for which she received rent credits. 
On July 20, 1987, at a hearing on the 
vorkers' compensation claim of Turner's 
uisband, Inteltech employees appeared and 
estified about information gathered through 
he undercover investigation. It was then that 
Turner first became aware that Inteltech 
employees had represented themselves as 
narket researchers for the purpose of invest-
gating her husband's claim. After the 
tearing, the administrative law judge denied 
he workers'compensation claim. 
Turner sued, claiming fraud, invasion of 
privacy, and conspiracy. She sought special, 
;eneral, and punitive damages. The case was 
ried to a jury on March 12 through 14,1990. 
At the close of Turner's case, defendants 
noved for a directed verdict, which the court 
lenied. Turner, in turn, moved for a directed 
erdict at the close of defendants' cases, 
vhich the court took under advisement. The 
ssues of fraud, invasion of privacy, conspi-
acy, and Norton's personal liability were 
ubmitted to the jury. The jury rendered a 
erdict against Turner on both the fraud and 
nvasion of privacy claims, and therefore, did 
lot reach the conspiracy claim and damages 
ssues. Thereafter/Turner moved for j.n.o.v. 
md for a new trial on all issues submitted to 
he jury. ^ » ?:• , y-
After oral argument, the trial court granted 
.n.o.v. and denied the motion for a new trial. 
could have differed on the evidence which was 
presented to [the jury] .... And it was highly 
offensive to this Court for the defendants to 
do what they did to [Turner]." As to the claim 
of fraud, the court found that Turner proved 
damages in the amount of twenty dollars for 
the babysitter. The court, however, found that 
Turner's evidence concerning damages for lost 
work time was "too speculative." 
The court entered judgment, jointly and 
severally, against GAB and Inteltech on the 
fraud, invasion of privacy, and conspiracy 
claims in the following amounts: $20.00 for 
out-of-pocket damages; $5,000.00 for 
general damages; $3,000.00 for punitive 
damages; post-judgment interest; and atto-
rney fees. The trial court further found 
Norton to be personally liable for the entire 
I amount of the judgment. Turner moved to 
amend the judgment to allow the damages 
issues to go to the jury. The court denied the 
motion. ' •'• ' 
STANDARD OF REVIEW . 
A j.n.o.v. can be granted only when the 
losing party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 
(Utah 1988). In other words, j.n.o.v. "is only 
justified if, after looking at the evidence and 
all of its reasonable inferences in a light most 
favorable to the party moved against, the trial 
court concludes that there is no competent 
evidence which would support a verdict in his 
favor." Gustaveson v. Gregg, 655 P.2d 693, 
695 (Utah 1982); King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 
618, 620 (Utah 1987). On appeal, we apply the 
same standard. Gustaveson, 655 P.2d at 695; 
King, 739 P.2d at 620. In determining whether 
competent evidence supports the verdict, we 
accept as true all testimony and reasonable 
inferences flowing therefrom that tend to 
prove defendants' case, and we disregard all 
conflicts and evidence that tend to disprove 
defendants' case. Koer v. May fair Mkts., 19 
Utah 2d 339,431 P.2d 566,568-69 (1967). 
FRAUD 
Defendants contend that the trial court 
erred in granting j.n.o.v. because competent 
evidence supported the jury's verdict of no 
fraud in that Turner was not damaged as a 
result of the undercover investigation. 
To establish fraud, a party must prove by 
clear and convincing evidence each of the 
following elements: (1) a representation was 
J made; (2) concerning a presently existing 
material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which 
the representor either (a) knew to be false, or 
(b) made recklessly, knowing that there was 
insufficient knowledge upon which to base 
such a representation; (5) for the purpose of 
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) 
that the other party, acting reasonably and in 
ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely 
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(9) to that party's injury and damage.1 Mik-
kelson v. Quail Valley Realty, 641 P.2d 124, 
126 (Utah 1982); Pace v. Parris/i, 122 Utah 
141,144-45,247 P.2d 273,274-75 (1952). 
The trial court in the instant case applied 
the wrong standard in granting j.n.o.v. 
Instead of determining whether competent 
evidence supported the verdict, see, e.g., King 
v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618, 620 (Utah 1987), the 
court found that no reasonable minds could 
have differed on the evidence presented. 
Viewing the evidence in favor of defendants, 
we conclude that substantial competent evid-
ence supported the jury's verdict of no cause 
of action for fraud. Turner's evidence that she 
sustained damage when she hired and paid a 
babysitter apparently was not, as viewed by 
the jury, clear and convincing. At trial, when 
asked how - much she paid the babysitter. 
Turner vaguely and equivocally testified, "I 
think it was like twenty bucks or something 
like that .... It was reasonable." Furthermore, 
Turner did not identify the babysitter nor did 
she produce evidence of payment as claimed. 
Finally, competent evidence supported the 
jury's implied finding that Turner did not 
sustain any lost work time damages. Consis-
tent with the jury's finding, the court found 
this claim to be "too speculative" inasmuch as 
it was based solely on Turner's unsubstanti-
ated assertions of lost work time. Because the 
jury had competent evidence to support its 
verdict that no fraud occurred,2 the trial court 
erred in. granting j.n.o.v. on the claim;.of 
fraud.3 
INVASION OF PRIVACY 
"; Defendants claim that competent evidence 
supported the jury's verdict that there was no 
invasion of Turner's privacy. Invasion of 
privacy as a common law tort has developed 
into four distinct,.torts.4 However, Turner's 
cause of action.is based only on the tort of 
intrusion upon sedusion..: ? •-.. - -
To establish an invasion of privacy claim of 
intrusion upon seclusion,5 a complaining party 
must prove by a preponderance of the evid-
ence an intentional substantial intrusion, 
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or 
seclusion of the complaining party that would 
be highly offensive to the reasonable person.* 
Restatement (Second) of-Torts §652B & cmt^  
d (1977); accord W. Page Keeton et a/., Prosser 
and Keeton on the Law of Torts, 
§117, at 855 (5th ed. 1984). The language 
"highly offensive to the reasonable person" 
suggests a determination of fact for which a 
jury is uniquely qualified. See Cruz v. 
Montoya; 660 P.2d 723, 729 (Utah 1983). In 
determining issues of fact,7 a'jury necessarily 
accepts the testimony of certain witnesses and 
discounts conflicting: testimony. Fillmore 
Prods, v. Western States Paving, 592 P.2d 
581, 582 (Utah 1979). On appeal, we will not 
unless no competent evidence supports the 
verdict. Id. 
After viewing the evidence and all reason-
able inferences flowing therefrom in a light 
most favorable to defendants, see Koer v. 
May fair Mkts., 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d 566, 
568-69 (1967), we conclude that competent 
evidence supported the jury's verdict of no 
invasion of privacy. The record discloses first, 
that the purpose and scope of the undercover 
investigation was limited to gathering infor-
mation concerning the workers' compensation 
claim.8 Second, at no time did Inteltech repr-
esentatives enter Turner's home without her 
permission. Third, the investigation visits were 
relatively short. Fourth, Turner's credibility 
was called into question by competent evid-
ence. Based on the foregoing, the jury could 
reasonably conclude, as it apparently did, that 
Inteltech employees did not substantially 
intrude in a manner that would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person. Therefore, 
the trial court erred by granting j.n.o.v. on the 
invasion of privacy claim. 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES FOR 
FRAUD 
Turner cross appeals, claiming that the trial 
court erred by refusing to instruct the jury 
that emotional distress damages may be reco-
vered in a fraud action. A challenge to a trial 
court's refusal to give a jury instruction pre-
sents questions of law. Ramon By and 
Through Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131, 133 
(Utah 1989). Consequently, we do not defer to 
the trial court's rulings. Id. We affirm such a 
refusal when the proposed instruction does not 
properly and fairly state the law as applied to 
the facts of the case. Id. at 133-34. r: •• 
Whether emotional distress damages are 
recoverable for fraud is a question of first 
impression under Utah law. Authorities are 
split on this issue. Illustrative of decisions not 
allowing recovery of . emotional . distress 
damages in a fraud action are Cornell v. 
Wunschel, 408 N.W.2d 369, 382 (Iowa 1987); 
Carrigg v. Blue, 323 S.E.2d 787, 789 n.l (S.C. 
Ct. App. 1984); Vmphrey v. Sprinkel, 682 
P.2d 1247, 1258-59 (Idaho 1983); Ellis v. 
Crockett, 451 P.2d 814, 820 (Haw. 1969); and 
Harsche v. Czyz, 61 N.W.2d 265, 272 (Neb. 
1953). In contrast, Kilduff v. Adams, Inc., 
593 A.2d 478, 484 (Conn. 1991); Trimble v. 
City of Denver, 697 P.2d 716,, 730 (Colo. 
1985); Crowley v. Global Realty, Inc., 474 
A.2d 1056, 1058 (N.H. 1984); McRae v. 
Bolstad, 646 P.2d 771,-775-76 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1982), afPd, 676 P.2d -496 (Wash. 
1984); and Rosener v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
168 Cal. Rptr-s 237, 246 (1980), appeal dismi-
ssed, 450 U.S. 1051, 101 S. Ct. 1772 (1981) 
illustrate decisions allowing such recovery. 
' As - - indicated above, -• many jurisdictions 
follow the rule that. emotional distress 
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n for fraud. Cf. First Sec. Bank of Utah 
B.J. Feedyards, Inc., 653 P.2d 591, 598 
h 1982) (emotional distress damages "are 
ctreme remedy, which should be dispensed 
caution"). This rule stems from the pri-
e that fraud, as an economic tort, prot-
only pecuniary losses. Walsh v. Ingersoll-
i Co., 656 F.2d 367, 370 (8th Cir. 1981). 
•rding to a leading treatise on remedies: 
[Djeceit is an economic, not a dig-
nitary tort, and resembles, in the 
interests it seeks to protect, a con-
tract claim more., than a tort claim. ,„ 
For this reason, though strong men • 
may cry at the loss of money, sep-
arate recovery for mental anguish is -
usually denied in deceit cases, just 
as it is denied in contract cases, ' 
simply because emotional distress, ^ 
though resulting naturally.. enough .^^ 
from many frauds, is not one of the .n" 
interests the law ordinarily seeks to •• ^ 
protect in deceit cases. < • - - - -r 
>obbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies, 
at 602 (1973) (footnotes omitted); see 
Pihakis v. CottreU, 243 So.2d 685, 692 
1971) ("plaintiff must show ... actual 
niary loss as the result of the fraud"); Jur-
v. General Motors Corp., 539 S.W.2d 
600-01 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) ("deceit 
lgs to that class of tort of which pecun-
loss constitutes a part of the cause of 
n"). . ,..u,v. 
tder section 525 .„ of the Restatement 
>nd) of Torts, - "One who fraudulently 
s a misrepresentation of fact,>... is 
xt to liability to the other in deceit for 
niary loss." (Emphasis added.) Further-
t, in addressing the measure of damages 
fraudulent misrepresentation, section 549 
le Restatement states, "The recipient of a 
lulent misrepresentation is entitled to 
'er ..: the pecuniary loss r.V of which the 
^presentation is a legal cause, including" 
lifference between the value of what was 
/ed in the transaction and its purchase 
and "pecuniary loss suffered otherwise as 
^sequence of ... the misrepresentation." 
itement (Second) of Torts §549(1 )(a) and 
1977) (emphasis added).: While the Rest-
cm does not specifically exclude emoti-
distress damages in a cause of action for 
[, the repeated references to "pecuniary 
implicitly'- excludes: such ^recovery. R. 
i, Recovery of "Damages for .Fraud 156 
) . . : ' : . : ; • " . \ : . r , r : • : ' • : : . • : ^ , : - • 
ismuch as fraud is an economic tort dir-
towards redressing pecuniary losses, Cor-
408 N.W^d at ,382; Walsh, 656 F.2d 
0, we conclude that the better reasoned 
>ach is to disallow recovery of emotional 
ss damages in a fraud action. As a result, 
ial court correctly refused to instruct the 
EVIDENCE OF PSYCHIATRIC HISTORY 
AND PAST DRUG USE 
On cross appeal, Turner claims that the trial 
court erred by admitting evidence concerning 
her psychiatric history and past drug use. 
Whether evidence is admissible is a question of 
law reviewed under a correctness standard. Stare 
v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 
1991).* 
Turner contends that the trial court erred in 
admitting evidence of her psychiatric history 
and past drug use because the evidence was 
irrelevant. Evidence is relevant if it has "any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination of 
the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence." .Utah R. 
Evid. 401. Quite clearly* the evidence pertai-
ning to Turner's psychiatric'history and past 
drug use was relevant to the determination of 
whether her claimed emotional distress 
damages under her invasion of privacy claim 
were the result,of a preexisting condition or 
were caused by defendants' conduct. , 
Turner contends that even if the evidence 
relating to her psychiatric history and past 
drug use were relevant,, the court erred in 
admitting it because the prejudicial effect of 
the evidence outweighed its probative value. 
Under Utah Rule of Evidence 403,.relevant 
evidence may.be excluded if "its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice.".The trial court's deter-
mination that evidence, is admissible under 
Rule 403 is reviewed for correctness, "[b]ut in 
deciding whether the trial court erred as a 
matter of law, we de facto grant it some dis-
cretion, because we reverse only if we conc-
lude that it acted unreasonably in striking the 
balance." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 n.3. In 
Terry, x. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 60S 
P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), rev'd on other grounds,' 
McFarland v.Skaggs Cos., 678 P.2d 298,304 
(Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court defined 
evidence that is "unfairly prejudicial" as evi-
dence having.', "V- V-* ^ - \>~. '• .1 
v"a tendency to influence the outcome ,..: 
•«•' of the trial by improper means, or 
if it appeals to the jury's sympat-
- hies, or arouses its sense of horror, * ! 
;*• provokes its instinct to punish or ' 
^Qotherwise causes a jury to base its 
:~ .decision on something other than ,' 
^ • the. established propositions of the 
• v. case*., :<:-.& ,. « * -•. .- ,- . .:> -v. . .-•,..-... 
Jtf.at323ri.31: lW ;>"- -JS*-;---~ '• \^^ - v 
r
- The evidence involving Turner's psychiatric 
history and past drug: use was probative of 
whether -her claimed emotional distress 
damages were the result of a preexisting con-
dition or were caused by defendants' conduct. 
Having reviewed the trial court's determina-
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not substantially outweigh the evidence's 
probative value, we conclude, in light of the 
discretion given to a trial court in performing 
a Rule 403 balancing, that the court correctly 
admitted the evidence. 
Finally, pursuant to the tort law doctrine 
commonly referred to as the "thin-skull" or 
"eggshell skull" rule,10 Turner argues that 
because defendants are required to take her as 
they find her, the court abused its discretion in 
admitting evidence of her psychiatric history 
and past drug use. This argument fails 
because, "even though it is true that one who 
injures another takes him as he is, nevertheless 
the plaintiff may not recover damages for any 
pre-existing condition or disability she may 
have had which did not result from any fault 
of the defendant." Brunson v. Strong, 17 Utah 
2d 364, 412 P.2d 451, 453 (1966) (footnote 
omitted). 
CONCLUSION .:.<: ' 
For the above-stated reasons, we conclude 
that the trial court (1) erred in granting 
j.n.o.v., (2) correctly refused to instruct the 
jury that emotional distress damages are rec-
overable in a cause of action for fraud, and 
(3) correctly admitted evidence concerning 
Turner's psychiatric history and past drug use. 
Other arguments raised by the parties need not 
be considered in view of our decision herein. 
Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial 
court, and remand for judgment consistent 
with the jury's verdict. No costs are awarded. 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge .
 r ~ 
WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
 lj: 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
1. GAB contends that Turner must prove substantial 
damage to recover under her claim of fraud. In 
support, GAB cites to Dilworth v. Lauritzen, • 18 
Utah 2d 386, 424 PJtd 136, 138 (1967), where the 
Utah Supreme Court, after stating that "one of the 
essential elements of fraud is that the plaintiff 
sustain damages," cites to Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 
141, 144-45, 247 P.2d 273, 274-75 (1952), and 
section 105 of the third edition of Prosser on Torts 
(currently located at section 110 of the fifth edition 
of Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts). Alth-
ough section 110 of Prosser and Keeton on the Law 
of Torts supports the proposition that substantial 
damage is required before a fraud or deceit cause of 
action can arise, see W*. Page Keeton et a/., Prosser 
and Keeton on the Law of Torts, §110, at 765 & 
n.l (5th ed. 1984), GAB reads Dilworth too 
broadly. Utah law requires that a party sustain only 
some injury or damage. See Mikkelson v. Quail 
Valley Realty, 641 P.2d 124, 126 (Utah 1982); Dugan 
v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980); Taylor v. 
Gasor, Inc., 607 P.2d 293, 294 (Utah 
1980); Rummell v. Bailey, 7 Utah 2d 137, 320 P.2d 
653, 659 (1958); Pace, 247 P.2d at 274-75. More-
over, this court has interpreted Pace to require that 
a complaining party need only 'establish some 
damage." Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs., 739 
r.2<X 634, 640 (Utah App. 1987). 
2. The failure to prove any of the previously ment-
ioned elements of fraud is fatal to a complaining 
party's case. Inasmuch as competent evidence sup-
ports the jury's implied finding of no damage, we 
need not address arguments concerning other elem-
ents of fraud. 
3. Assuming, arguendo, Turner could prove some 
sort of damage under her fraud claim, as a compl-
aining party, she still had a duty to mitigate 
damages. Conder, 739 P.2d at 639. A complaining 
party is not entitled to recover damages resulting 
from wrongful conduct which could have been 
avoided or minimized by reasonable means. Angelos 
v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 P.2d 772, 777 
(Utah 1983); Conder, 739 P.2d at 639. 
Defendants* evidence demonstrates that Turner 
failed to mitigate the damages she claims to have 
sustained by having to hire and pay a babysitter. 
Turner testified that an Inteltech investigator called 
and cancelled the shopping spree the day it was 
scheduled. Other than the bald statement that the 
babysitter still had to be paid, Turner gave no exp-
lanation why she could not cancel the babysitter or 
otherwise minimize her damages. 
4. In the classic article entitled Privacy, Prosser 
enumerated the four torts under the right to privacy 
as follows: V..A»: v 
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiffs sec-
lusion or solitude, or. into his private 
affairs; .:. ' -
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing 
:,'." private facts about the plaintiff; ..'., 
3. Publicity.which places the plaintiff '-*..r 
' in a false light in the public eye; and 
"4 . Appropriation, for the defendant's' " ' 
advantage, of the plaintiffs name or 
likeness. - . .-
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383, 
389 (1960); Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 563 n.7 
(Utah 1988). "- •:. .:+ ,; 
5. There is little case law to assist us in the determ-
ination we make today concerning Turner's invasion 
of privacy claim. The most probable reason for this 
isbecause . ; ; ; .. r. „„..r\ . . ' r-':••:•< - .* v . : 
. _ even today most individuals not acting
 0 
in some clearly identified.official capa-Mft:t 
.( city do not go .into,.private homes 
'.without the consent of those living "_ 
there; not only do widely held notions 
of decency preclude it, but most indivi-^  ' 
duals understand that to do so is either'*v~ 
a tort, a crime, or both. ' - "'\ ***•; 
Miller v. National Broadcasting Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 
668,678-79 (Ct. App. 1986) (footnotes omitted). 
6. Once a party establishes a cause of action for 
invasion of privacy, that party recovers, for mental 
distress damages proved, if such damages are.the 
kind that -normally result from such an invasion. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §652H(b) (1977); see 
also Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co/, 
291 P.2d 194, 198 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955) ('the fact 
that damages resulting from an invasion of the right 
of privacy cannot be measured by a pecuniary sta-
ndard is not a bar to recovery *). "' 
7. The jury has broad prerogatives in determining 
issues of fact. Evans v. Stuart, 11 Utah 2d 308/410 
P.2d999.1002(1966). . ^ l i ^ s - -
8. There is no evidence in the record and no claims 
were made at trial that Inteltech employees harassed 
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EXHIBIT B 
American Marketing Research & Development 
50 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
SUITE (00 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 14144 
1801)535-4373 
Mr. and Mrs. 
Dear Mr. and Mrs. 
We would like to officially welcome you on board as consumer product 
tester for American Marketing Research and Development. Thank you 
for your willingness to work with your area field researcher, Mr. Hyer. 
AMRD is an independent marketing firm. AMRD is not affiliated with 
any of the corporations or their subsidiaries for whom we do research. 
Our unaffiliated status enables AMRD to be totally objective. 
Under FTC guidelines, we are required to inform you that: 1) no test 
product can or will be sold to you;' 2) you are permitted to terminate 
your testing at any point; and 3) all test results are coded for com-
puter use and your name is not associated with them, unless stipulated 
by your prior, written consent. 
Our marketing existence depends on insightful product analysis from 
unbiased consumers like yourself, who have been chosen on a completely 
random, demographic basis. 
Optimum testing results are obtained when consumers do not alter their 
regular routine while using the products. Assimilate your normal usage 
as much as possible, if a product does not perform up to expectations, 
please let us know. Don't be afraid to report negative results. We 
never solicit unfavorable analysis, but such findings can be invaluable 
to the manufacturers. 
If you ever have questions about a test product, or encounter a problem 
with any study, please give me a call at (412) 261-0430. 
Sincerely. 
k -/. / 'Si*^* -**zA?^ 
Charles (Chuck) Sortore 
Marketing Research Director 
C5/lp 
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